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tion does not quite fall within one of the already-established exceptions.8 8
This seems unusual in light of the fact that the tribunals of this state have,
generally, kept abreast of changes in the law engendered by changing
conditions. However, there has been some judicial recognition in Illinois
(especially in food cases) of the fact that merchandising methods in the
past decade are evidencing more and more a return to the methods preva-
lent in the 19th century where the manufacturer sold direct to the con-
sumer. Today, with the advent of large-scale advertising through the
media of radio, television, newspapers, and magazines the manufacturer
creates consumer demand for his product. The retailing function has lost
its effect as an instrument for inducing purchases of particular products,
and is, today, generally, a clerking, rather than a selling function. Thus
the circle is complete. The manufacturer is once again the seller, and the
consumer is once again the party to whom his warranties are directed.
This practice has already been recognized by the courts of the states
which have abolished the privity requirement. It seems only a matter of
time before the Illinois courts will recognize it.
88 Biller v. Allis Chalmers Mfg., Co., 34 III. App. 2d 47, 180 N.E. 2d 46 (1962);
Albin v. Illinois Crop Improvement Ass'n., 30 Ill. App. 2d 283, 174 N.E. 2d 697 (1962);
Watts v. Bacon & Van Buskirk Glass Co., 20 Ill. App. 2d 164, 163 N.E. 2d 425 (1959).
CONGRESS AND THE WELFARE POWER
The increasing concern over Congressional legislation geared to pro-
moting the "welfare" of the nation can hardly be disputed. One only need
refer to the daily newspapers and various legal periodicals to find a grow-
ing awareness of the extensive welfare power being vested in the federal
government today. Illustrative of this is a transcript of an "All America
Wants to Know" program entitled "What's Welfare Worth," read into
the Congressional Record of Monday, February 11, 1963.1 The program
consisted of a panel discussion based on an article entitled "The Fallacy
of Too Much Planning" appearing in the February, 1963, issue of Reader's
Digest and being one of a series of articles written by Mr. Henry Hazlitt.
Senators Goldwater, Randolph and Ribicoff, as well as Mr. Hazlitt, par-
ticipated in the panel discussion. Some of the statements made during this
program illustrate the concern over welfare legislation prevalent in this
country today; Sen. Goldwater speaking:
First of all Mr. Hazlitt and myself are not opposed to welfare. I don't think
any Christian human being can be opposed to helping his brother. But we are
fearful that when the state takes this entire responsibility, I speak of the state
1 109 Cong. Rec. 1999 (daily ed.) Feb. 11, 1963.
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as the federal government, the controls that have to go with the expenditure
of this money-constitutionally have to go with it-will result in other controls
that ultimately can be destructive of freedom.
2
Senator Ribicoff speaking later on:
we are a people who aren't going to let people starve. And since we're not
going to let them starve, and we don't want to continue giving them relief
checks, then we must give them the training for a job. Now who is to give
then the training? The only one that can give them the training is some
level of government-local, state or national. Now the weakness of Senator
Goldwater's argument to give this all back to the State is because these prob-
lems are national in scope, and we have wealthy states if we do it, and we
would have some very poor states, where the needs are greatest, that would do
nothing for their needs.3
The significant factor to be observed is that this disagreement over the
welfare power of Congress has involved two of the leading Congres-
sional figures. Strong criticism of the Supreme Court of the United States
along the same lines has emanated from the Illinois Legislature. A recent
issue of the Chicago Tribune4 carried an article written by Mr. Robert
Howard which reported that the Illinois Senate has adopted two resolu-
tions proposing amendment of the federal constitution and calling for the
first convention of state delegates since 1787. The gravamen of the criti-
cism of the Illinois Legislature is that the Supreme Court's decisions have
usurped a great deal of state's rights and powers. Several other articles
have appeared in bar journals which have expressed fears and doubts as to
Congress' exercise of power in the area of welfare, and the Supreme
Court's approval of such action.5
A look at the bills pending before Congress at the present time gives
some insight into those welfare areas where Congress has already gained
control, those areas where Congress is seeking to enlarge its control, and
the power Congress is relying upon to pass such welfare legislation. One
such pending bill is the Clean Air Act of 1963,6 advocated by Senator
Ribicoff, which proposes to "accelerate, extend, and strengthen the fed-
eral air pollution control program."' 7 As Senator Ribicoff points out, the
federal government has only participated in such a program to the extent
2 Id. at 2001. 3 Id. at 2002.
4 Chicago Tribune, February 14, 1963, p. 1, col. 7 (final ed.).
5 White, Construing the Constitution: The New "Sociological Approach," 43 A.B.A.J.
(1957).
NiLssoN, There Is No "General Welfare Power" in the Constitution of the United
States, 47 A.B.A.J. 43 (1961).
McKay, Taxing and Spending for the General Welfare: A Reply to Mr. Nilsson, 48
A.B.A.J. 38 (1962).
6 S. 432, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
7 42 U.S.C. § 1857-1857 (f) (1959) (emphasis added).
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of scientific research and training of technical pcrsonnel. This bill pro-
poses to appropriate $74,000,000 for field laboratories throughout the
country and for a control program whereby the federal government
would establish enforcement agencies patterned after the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act." Although Senator Ribicoff admits that the basic
responsibility resides with state and local governments, he believes that
the federal government's role in this area is to provide for "leadership,
encouragement, technical know-how, and financial assistance to local and
State governments in the development of a national program of research
and development for the prevention and control of air pollution."" In
effect, this act exemplifies an attempt by Congress to enlarge its present
control over local air pollution, which is essentially, a problem of general
welfare.
Another bill pending before Congress which has received wide public-
ity is the Medicare program sponsored by the Kennedy administration.
The program basically provides for a health insurance plan for persons
over sixty-five, special housing for the elderly, increased job opportuni-
ties, and other provisions to protect the elderly against worthless foods,
devices and nostrums. That the motive behind this program is the con-
cern over the welfare of one faction of our population is obvious from
Mr. Kennedy's own words in a recent speech to Congress.10 The under-
lying approach to this problm is based upon the presumption that the
health of the citizens of this country is a national problem, and as such,
Congress has the power and the obligation to appropriate and provide for
its preservation and care." The intended result of this program is to in-
crease the federal government's regulation in the areas of health and
medicine by enlarging the scope of the Social Security Act. In light of
these pending programs, the inquiry naturally arises as to what constitu-
tional provision Congress is relying upon in seeking to assert its control
over welfare-type activities. It appears to be a reasonable presumption 12
that Congress is relying upon Article I section 8 of the Constitution which
provides that, "the Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes,
duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common
defence and general welfare of the United States; .. ."13 Assuming this to
be the case, the inquiry then turns to the interpretation of this clause.
That there is still confusion over the interpretation of this clause after 170
8 33 U.S.C. S 466-466K (1959). 9 See supra note 6, at p. 755.
10 109 CONG. REC. 1835-36 (daily ed.) Feb. 7, 1963.
11 Id. at 1836.
121n light of the language used and the purposes sought, Congress is "appropriating"
to provide for the general welfare and this comes directly under Article I S 8.
'a See other enumerated powers under Article I S 8.
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years of constitutional history is apparent from recent articles which
have been written by practicing attorneys and scholars of the law. 14 It is
the purpose of this comment, then, to discuss the clause from its inception
at the rime of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, and follow its de-
velopment by the Supreme Court throughout the twentieth century to
the present time in order to discern the nature of the power that Congress
has in this area, and the limitations, if any, on that power.
A cursory examination of the history of Article I section 8 reveals that
there are basically two constitutional periods relevant to this clause-the
pre-1936 period and the post-1936 period. The starting point of the pre-
1936 period dates back to the Constitutional Convention of 1787. At this
time, there existed a difference of opinion as to the interpretation of the
welfare clause. Madison viewed the general welfare provision as a gen-
eral caption restricted by the specific powers enumerated in the various
clauses immediately following this provision. As he pointed out in one of
his Federalist papers,
But what color can the objection [against the welfare clause] have, when a
specification of the objects alluded to by these general terms immediately
follows, and is not even separated by a longer pause than a semicolon? ... for
what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these
and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power?
Nothing is more natural or common than first to use a general phrase, and then
to explain and qualify it by recital of particulars. 15
Hamilton, on the other hand, developed the view that the welfare clause
conferred upon Congress an independent power to tax and spend for the
general welfare of the Nation and was not limited by the specific enu-
merated powers listed thereunder. The only limitation that Hamilton con-
ceived in this power was that this exercise of power be limited to general
welfare purposes.' 6 It must be realized that the people in this political
climate feared a strong central government and to support the view that
this clause granted to the federal government unlimited welfare power
would have undoubtedly resulted in a failure to get the proposed consti-
tution ratified by all the states. Thus, the view that this clause granted
Congress unlimited welfare power, if advocated at all, at this time, was
done so by a very limited minority. Despite these differences of opinion,
the Constitution was ratified with the general welfare clause included
therein, and throughout this whole pre-1936 period, the Supreme Court
managed to steer a course clear of any involvement with this problem by
14 Nilsson, There Is No "General Welfare Power" in the Constitution of the United
States, 47 A.B.A.J. 43 (1961).
McKay, Taxing and Spending for the General Welfare: A Reply to Mr. Nilsson,
48 A.B.A.J. 38 (1962).
15 FEDERALSr PAPER, No. 41. 16 FmEtALsT PAPER, No. 83.
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side-stepping the issue of the scope of the national spending power when
it arose. Thus, in Field v. Clark,'7 suit was instituted by importers to ob-
tain a refund of duties placed on imported merchandise under a tariff
act.' The Supreme Court declared that the question of the scope of the
national spending power was one of very gravest importance, that it
should not be decided without very mature investigation and delibera-
tion, and only when absolutely necessary. The rights of the parties were
passed upon without entering into a discussion as to the validity of the
bounty.19 Four years later, the Court repeated this statement in United
States v. Realty Co.,20 where action was brought under the Tucker Act 2'
to obtain payment of money in regard to sugar bounties. Effectually, the
Supreme Court was relieved of deciding whether the Madisonian or the
Hamiltonian view was the proper interpretation of this constitutional
provision.
At this juncture, it would be pertinent to draw a very relevant distinc-
tion between legislation passed under the welfare clause, and legislation
passed under one of the other enumerated powers but which involves the
regulation of some activity which concerns and affects the general wel-
fare. Throughout this whole pre-1936 period, the cases which came up
before the Supreme Court did not involve Congressional Acts passed pur-
suant to the welfare clause. The principal cases involved legislation passed
primarily under the taxing power or the commerce power, and involved
an attempted regulation by Congress of activities which could be consid-
ered as harmful to the welfare of the Nation. The case of Mc Cray v.
United States22 is significant as illustrative of this distinction under the
taxing power. Congress passed an Act increasing a federal tax on yellow
margarine from two to ten cents per pound, while the tax on white mar-
garine was one-fourth cent per pound. The Court held that the tax was a
legitimate exercise of Congress' taxing power. In considering the consti-
tutionality of this Act, the Supreme Court stated that the tax was neither
a regulation of a state concern, nor a penalty on its face, and the fact that
a motive other than taxation was involved would not invalidate the Act.
The "other motive" referred to was the concern by Congress over the
possible pawning-off of yellow margarine as butter by retailers. Although
this was the evil Congress sought to avert, the regulation of this evil was
accomplished under the taxing power. In Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.23
17 143 U.S. 649 (1892). 19 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 695 (1892).
18 26 Stat. 567, c. 1244. 20 163 U.S. 427 (1896).
2128 U.S.C. SS 761, 1346, 1491-1494, 1501, 1503, 2071, 2072, 2401, 2411, 2412, 2501,
2509-2511 (1959).
22 195 U.S. 27 (1904); Aff'd in Sonzinsky v. U.S., 300 U.S. 506 (1937).
23 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Aff'd in U.S. v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
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(Child Labor Tax Case), a federal statute imposed an excise tax of ten
per cent of the entire net profits for the year upon persons who know-
ingly employed children and thereby violated the statute's provisions.
The Court stated that Congress may tax any appropriate subject-matter
and these taxes will not lose their character as such because of an ulterior
or incidental motive of Congress. The Court continued saying that if a
tax regulates and/or punishes, it may lose its character as a tax and be-
come a penalty. Here Congress' attempt to regulate child labor by taxa-
tion showed on the face of the Act and amounted to a penalty, a penalty
on purely local subject-matter-child labor. Thus, the Act was declared
unconstitutional because the proposed tax was in fact, as it appeared on its
face, a penalty. Penalties mean control and regulation, and Congress can
only control and regulate in those areas of enumerated powers, and child
labor is not such an area. In this case, Congress' motive was to eliminate
child labor but the legislation was not framed as a direct prohibition
against child labor. Rather, the prohibition was once again attempted un-
der the guise of the taxing power. In both of these cases, the Supreme
Court was only called upon to decide if the particular Acts of Congress
were constitutional under the Congressional power to tax, and therefore
the general welfare clause was not discussed. Thus, Congress used its tax-
ing power to exert regulation and control in the area of general welfare.
The mechanism used by Congress to effectuate welfare legislation based
on the taxing power was similarly employed with the commerce power.
Illustrative of the use of the commerce power in this pre-1936 period is
the case of Hammer v. Dagenhart.24 In this case, Congress had passed an
Act which essentially forbade the interstate transportation of goods
which had been manufactured with the help of children under the age of
fourteen. The plaintiff, a minor, sought to enjoin the enforcement of the
Act on the basis that it infringed upon the first, fifth and tenth amend-
ment rights. The Supreme Court held the Act unconstitutional on the
basis that Congress was really attempting to regulate child labor, a social
evil, and the regulation of social evil was held to be exclusively within the
power of the state because such regulation is not granted to Congress
anywhere in the Constitution. Thus, it must be a power reserved to the
state within the meaning of the tenth amendment. It is clear that the mo-
tive of Congress in passing such an Act was to regulate an activity harm-
ful to the general welfare of the Nation-child labor. The point is, al-
though the Act was intended to regulate an activity harmful to the
welfare, this piece of legislation was passed pursuant to the commerce
power.
24 247 U.S. 251 (1918). Although this case was overruled by the Supreme Court in
U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) it illustrates the point the writcrs are distinguishing
in the pre-1936 period.
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A second significant example of a decision by the Supreme Court in-
volving an Act where Congress- attempted to effect general welfare by
using its commerce power was Champion v. Ames25 (The Lottery Case).
Here, it was held that Congress might pass a law punishing the transmis-
sion of lottery tickets from one state to another, in order to prevent the
carriage of those tickets to be sold in other states and thus demoralize,
through a spread of the gambling habit, individuals who were likely to
purchase tickets. Thus, Congress was again able to legislate for the gen-
eral welfare, i.e. protection of the Nation's morals, by using the com-
merce power. The examples would be endless, 26 Thus, the conclusion is
that whenever Congress sought to regulate some activity harmful to the
general welfare of the Nation, it could fashion this piece of legislation in
the form of a tax, or a regulation under interstate commerce. If its consti-
tutionality was questioned, the Supreme Court would only be called upon
to determine whether or not the extent of the attempted regulation was
within the scope of the power, i.e. tax or commerce, relied upon to pass
the Act. So long as the legislation neither appeared on its face to be a reg-
ulation of a state concern, nor a penalty, the Supreme Court was com-
pelled to uphold the Act.
Throughout this pre-1936 period, the Supreme Court's approach was to
analyze the motives of Congress behind the piece of legislation in question
when deciding whether or not to uphold the particular Act. More often
than not, Congress' motives were kindled by a concern for the general
welfare, discussed above, but the legislative product of these motives was
based on some other power of the Constitution. Thus, the Supreme Court
was called upon to determine the constitutionality of particular Acts only
on the basis of whether or not the attempt to regulate the activity in
question (the motive behind the tax) was within constitutional limitations
of specific legislative powers. Since Article I section 8-the welfare clause
-was never used to justify any legislation, the Supreme Court was re-
lieved of deciding the scope of the general welfare clause and the nature
of the power it conferred.
This brings us to the case of United States v. Butler, 27 decided in 1936.
Prior to this time, Congress had passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act
which established parity prices for the farmers, designed to increase their
purchasing power. The Act called for a tax to be levied on the processing
of certain goods, which was then earmarked for use by the Secretary of
25 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
26 Further cases involving some commerce clause legislation of a "welfare" character
are; (1) U.S. v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188 (1876); (2) U.S. v. Marigold, 9
How. 560 (1850); (3) U.S. v. Boston & A.R.R., 15 F.209 (1883).
27 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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Agriculture to regulate market and surplus agricultural products. The
Secretary of Agriculture included cotton on the list of taxable items and
assessed the processing tax against the defendant, a cotton processor. The
defendant challenged the Act and Congress' power to tax and appropriate
for the purpose of controlling the production of cotton. The government
contended that:
• . . Congress may appropriate and authorize the spending of moneys for the
general welfare" that this phrase should be liberally construed to cover any-
thing conducive to national welfare; that decision as to what will promote
such welfare rests with Congress alone, and the courts may not review its
determination; and, finally, that the appropriation under attack was in fact for
the general welfare of the United States.28
In effect, the government used the welfare clause of Article I section 8 to
justify the AAA and the Court finally had the opportunity to decide the
scope of this clause. The majority came to the conclusion that the Ham-
ilton view was the correct one, namely, that according to this view, Con-
gress was given an independent grant of power to tax and spend for the
general welfare by this provision in the Constitution. 9 The Supreme
Court held, however, that the AAA was unconstitutional because the
revenue was earmarked for spending by the Secretary of Agriculture in
advance, and since the money was not going into the general treasury, it
was not going toward supporting the government and hence was not a
true tax. More important than this, however, the Court held that the regu-
lation of agriculture was a purely state matter and thus, reserved to the
state by the tenth amendment. Therefore, Congress' attempt to regulate
in this area was violative of tenth amendment guaranties. The signif-
icance of this case lies in the fact that it represents the first occasion the
Supreme Court had to pass on the spending power of Congress, and the
Court gave full force and effect to the power of Congress to tax and
spend for the general welfare, as an independent power.
In the following year, Sonzinsky v. United States,30 another significant
case, came before the Supreme Court. Sustaining a tax on firearms, the
Court said:
Every tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent it interposes an
economic impediment to the activity taxed as compared with others not taxed.
But a tax is not any the less a tax because it has a regulatory effect, . . . ; and
it has long been established that an Act of Congress which on its face pur-
ports to be an exercise of the taxing power is not any the less because the tax
is burdensome or tends to restrict or suppress the thing taxed. Inquiry into
the hidden motives which may move Congress to exercise a power constitu-
28 Id. 64. 30 300 U.S. 506 (1937).
29 FEDERAIIST PAPER, no. 83.
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tionally conferred upon it is beyond the competancy of courts.... They will
not undertake, by collateral inquiry, as to the measure of the regulatory effect
of a tax, to ascribe to Congress an attempt, under the guise of taxation, to
exercise another power denied by the Federal Constitution.3'
This decision in 1937 had great significance in so far as the Supreme
Court expressly denied itself the power to look into the motives of Con-
gress in passing legislation and in effect, the Court surrendered a great
deal of its power of judicial review over legislative Acts of Congress.
Then, in City of Cleveland v. United States, 32 where the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937, the Court
declared that, "it not only is no longer an open question that Congress
has power to appropriate money to promote the general welfare, but the
determination of the Congress that the projects are in furtberance of the
general 'welfare is decisive, unless arbitrarily made and clearly wrong.' 33
The import of this decision was that the Court ascribed to Congress the
power to determine what projects are in furtherance of the general wel-
fare, and declared that it would no interfere unless it was "arbitrarily made
and clearly wrong." Such a test is of doubtful value, since one would rarely
ever find the Supreme Court declaring a decision by Congress clearly
wrong or arbitrarily made. About the only limitation set upon this deci-
sion by Congress as to the scope of what is included under general wel-
fare is that the project in question be national in scope.3 4 But this limita-
tion is further narrowed in that the Court is limited to determining only
whether or not there is any reasonable ground for the conclusion reached
by Congress that the project is national in scope.35 In any case, the net
result of the cases in this period has been to vest broad regulatory power
in the federal government to regulate and control the general welfare of
the Nation, subject only to very inconsequential judicial review by the
Supreme Court.
An article by Mr. Thomas White, investigating the centralization of
power in the federal government as a result of the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the welfare clause, appeared in the American Bar Association
Journal in 1957.36 The conclusion of this comment concurs with what
Mr. White asserted in his article. He goes on, however, to discern the
31 Id. 513-14. (emphasis added). 32 323 U.S. 329 (1945).
33 United States v. Boyle, 52 F. Supp. 906, 908 (1943) (emphasis added).
34 Washington Water Power Co. v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 9 F. Supp. 263 (D.
Idaho 1934).
35 Larabee Flour Mills Co. v. Nee, 12 F. Supp. 395 (D. Mo. 1935).
36Vhite, Construing the Constitution: The New "Sociological Approach," 43
A.B.A.J. (1957).
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factors which led the Supreme Court to interpret the welfare clause as
they have, in order to establish whether or not Congress' present broad
power in this area is legitimately within the grant of power in the Con-
stitution. Mr. White's major contention is that the Court has essentially
changed the construction of the Constitution by applying a new method
of interpreting the Constitution-what he calls the "sociological approach."
According to this method, "the inquiry is not what the legislator willed
when the law was passed but what he would have willed had he known
the present conditions." 37 This approach enables the Court to sustain laws
which under previous rulings would have been held invalid. He finds sev-
eral factors which were relevant in forcing the Court to adopt this ap-
proach, among which are: the New Deal administration in the 30's which
brought great pressure and criticism upon the Court; the effects of the
depression upon the people causing a popular appeal for welfare legisla-
tion; and political pressure brought by Congressmen who favored welfare
legislation and were being thwarted by the adverse rulings of the Court
throughout the early 30's. The fear that Mr. White expresses is that with
such an approach to interpreting the Constitution, the Court can effec-
tually change the Constitution whenever it sees the need for so doing,
thus endangering our constitutional form of government as the framers
viewed it.
Another more recent article,"" written by Mr. George Nilsson of the
Arizona Bar, is critical of the present-day Congress because he feels Con-
gress is exercising general welfare power and he claims that Congress is
not given general welfare power per se in the Constitution. Mr. Nilsson
uses a historical analysis of the welfare clause and examines the Federalist
papers and other such documents written during the time of the consti-
tutional conventions, and draws from these the conclusion that the fram-
ers never intended Congress to have general welfare power. As forceful
as these arguments appear, the fact is that Congress does not exercise wel-
fare power per se. Congress does, however, exercise the power to tax and
appropriate to provide for the general welfare, and the Supreme Court
has upheld this power,8 9 subject only to the limitations that the area legis-
lated for be national in scope, and that reasonable grounds exist for Con-
gress' decision that a certain area is national in scope. As intellectually
stimulating and interesting as these articles may be, any claim that Con-
gress is exercising general welfare power per se or any criticism of the
37 Id. at 84.
38 Nilsson, There Is No "General Welfare Power" in the Constitution of the United
States, 47 A.B.A.J. 43 (1961).
39 U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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Supreme Court or Congress based upon historical investigation, is of no
practical consequence. The power to tax and appropriate for the general
welfare has been found to exist and the Supreme Court has upheld this
power as being within the framework of the Constitution. This fact must
stand immutably.
Viewing the pending bills discussed at the beginning of this comment
in light of the above discussion, the conclusion is clear. Congress has de-
clared that the problems in the areas of health, air pollution, education,
and local mass transportation systems are national in scope and the vari-
ous speeches given in proposing legislation in these areas seek to give rea-
sonable grounds for this decision. Sen. Ribicoff, for example, claims that
polluted air has cost this country "billions" annually in the form of
waste and has caused other direct burdens upon the health and economy
of the nation. The President has declared that this country is only as
strong as its resources and services and the health condition of the citizens
of this country directly affects those services and resources. In view of
this line of reasoning, all these areas are national in scope and apparently
valid reasons have been advanced to support these views. Hence, these
areas necessarily fall within the category of general welfare thus giving
Congress the power "to tax and appropriate" to provide for each of them,
and "providing for" necessarily includes regulation. This conclusion
should be inescapable and leave no room for confusion in light of the
Supreme Court having declared such action by Congress to be within the
framework of the Constitution. The present day status of this power is such
that it can fairly be said that Congress can control, through its spending
power, practically any activity in this country today, without serious
fear of interference by the Supreme Court. The only alternatives remain-
ing which could occur to change this condition in the future are: (1) the
Supreme Court could overrule itself and adopt a new view of this power,
or (2) the Court could develop further qualifications and limitations to
curb the exercise of this power. Barring this, the result appears to be that
the federal government has not only assumed the State's police power
dealing with health, morals, safety and security advancing us toward the
welfare state, but also, it has asserted controls on the expenditure of
money for these functions which threaten to restrict individual freedoms
as well. The moral evaluation of this result involves a plethora of other
considerations such as: (1) the stress of international politics, (2) socio-
economic policy determinations, (3) contemporary community needs, all
of which are beyond the scope of this comment. However, we must at
least be aware of the repercussions of this tendency toward increased fed-
eralization so that evaluations of future decisions can be accurately con-
tained within those principles upon which our Constitution was adopted.
